When the collision occurred between the active American Iridium 33 satellite and the inactive Russian Cosmos 2251 satellite, very few took notice. The mainstream media did not seem particularly interested and many people are still not aware that a major collision destroyed a perfectly functioning piece of space hardware.

Before the collision, it was inconceivable to many that two satellites, especially two fully intact payloads, would collide and generate a massive debris field.

Those members of the mainstream media who did report on the collision chose to talk about how many pieces of "junk" were orbiting us and that this debris had to be dealt with. However, many did not choose to describe how our satellite population was  distributed and which of our satellites were most at risk. The irony was that the media was (and still is) greatly underreporting a major news story directly concerning the technology we all depend on every day to conduct business in the modern telecommunications era.

Through the media noise came a commanding voice. The Commander of U.S. Strategic Command, General Kevin P. Chilton, offered a voice of reason in a sea of seemingly useless hindsight and repetition of the obvious.

General Chilton's message was simple and direct. He stated that he wanted to increase expertise, personnel and investment in satellite tracking infrastructure. He also said something that was shocking, yet necessary. He said that "we are decades behind where we should be" with respect to conjunction analysis and collision avoidance.

To many, including satellite owners, that statement must have seemed like a lightning bolt. In my 13 years in satellite tracking, I have never heard anyone say this. I was neither dismayed nor downhearted. I became even more hopeful about the emerging science of satellite tracking.

Emotional and reactionary behaviour often follows a stern "head's up" from a senior leader. To many, General Chilton's statements must have seemed to reflect failure in one way or another. It seems to me that verbally attacking the U.S. for its failures is the norm because these failures are so few and far between. As far as space travel and space surveillance is concerned, the United States has no equal. To the U.S., space is a serious business. Period.

In my opinion, General Chilton's statements, though brutally honest, do not speak of failure, but are really words of stern encouragement. Some leaders might have simply downplayed the collision or not have brought up the situation at all. General Chilton brought it up time and time again over 2009 in numerous press releases. It appears to me that he feels as I do that the collision is a very serious warning to everyone invested in space.

Some space experts had thought that the U.S. had dropped the ball with respect to the collision. In my view, such a thought was short-sighted if not outright naive. In my own dealings with the 1st Command and Control Squadron (now called the 1st Space Command Squadron), I learned the truth about their professionalism and immense expertise. They are consummate professionals who dedicate their wealth of experience and knowledge to the success of their mission.  However, every system has a limit. Nothing is infallible. It is a fact that they did not predict this particular collision, but not because they "dropped the ball". This one just happened to fall through the cracks. It can happen to any organization that is trying to juggle over 14,000 balls at once.

A more enlightened question would be: How many collisions did the U.S. Space Command prevent since October 1957? Surely, the number is much greater than one. How many times have we heard about risks to the International Space Station or the Space Shuttle due to orbiting debris? How do they know where the debris is at any given moment? The Space Surveillance Network tracks over 14,000 objects on a regular basis; 12,000 of which are in low earth orbit between 200 and 2,000km above the Earth's surface. NORAD and the U.S. Space Command process all the tracking data and produces orbit elements that it uses to produce conjunction reports that are then sent to members of the satellite industry, such as Iridium LLC, and launching institutions such as NASA and ArianeSpace.

Although CASTOR has detected and tracked over 3,200 individual satellites, this is a small feat compared to the efforts of the U.S. space surveillance community. However, by tracking 3,200 satellites, I do have a unique understanding of the immense amount of effort required to track over 14,000 of them on a regular basis. Very few can honestly say this.

In my view, General Chilton's statements demonstrates to me that he understands, that although NORAD, etc. and other tracking partners have served extremely well up to 2009, the current space surveillance community is no longer able to predict every collision involving our active satellites. In other words, the satellite population has now outstripped the current capabilities for managing it. The message that arises from both the collision and General Chilton's statements is chilling, both to satellite owners and satellite users. Space surveillance has to evolve in order to improve its conjunction reporting frequency and accuracy. Perhaps General Chilton saw the collision for what it truly was: a disaster that could not be reversed or reconciled, but instead serves to inform and direct improvements to the space surveillance infrastructure.

The desire to blame someone for the collision is understandably easy, however, it will not solve anything in my opinion. I will be very surprised if any one institution will ever be singled out, since this collision is really about setting legal precedents. Not only that, it is setting legal precedents in space, something which is even a larger can of worms, since enforcement of such laws will be a significant challenge to all nations involved.

It has been over one year since the Iridium 33 - Cosmos 2251 collision. Who is legally liable if a collision occurs in space right now?...........................Exactly. There are virtually no legal definitions of responsibility or liability in space, therefore no entity can be presently held legally liable for any collision. This is the most frightening aspect that the collision has brought to light.

Since I had just as much experience in the new field of "satellite collisions" as anyone else, i.e. none, I decided to write a paper about the collision's consequences, its legal ramifications and the future of space surveillance. The paper was entitled: The Iridium 33 - Cosmos 2251 Collision: Creating Liability Awareness for Space Property and Contemplating the Future of Space Surveillance. A complimentary copy of this research paper was sent to General Chilton.

A few days before Christmas 2009, I received a notification from the General's office asking if USSTRATCOM could make several copies of my paper for distribution. I was amazed and honoured. For the first time, I was brought into direct contact with the world's premiere satellite community guardians.

Several days later, I received a letter from USSTRATCOM. When I read it, I was floored. It was from the General himself and it was written on his own stationary. It was a letter of thanks for the paper I had sent to him several weeks earlier. I do not suppose that many in Canada have received such a letter. The framed letter now sits on my desk as a constant reminder that someone cares about the subject of space surveillance and that it is a worthy subject to invest in.

Many more should be investing both intellectually and financially in the field of space surveillance, since it directly involves a satellite population that saves and enriches our lives every single day.

I wish to thank General Chilton once again for showing me that there are professionals out there who truly care about the subject of satellite tracking (AKA space surveillance) and it is a subject (and science) well worth pursuing and investing in for our future.